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Project and strategic management scholarship recognises the importance of project capabilities that allow ﬁrms to deliver projects. Although
work on project capabilities is a fast-growing line of inquiry, little is still known about how clients assemble project capabilities to achieve
operational outcomes in inter-organisational settings. This study seeks to apply theoretical work on project capabilities to the domain of
infrastructure project delivery in order to understand how the assembly of project capabilities in temporary inter-organisational settings contributes
to the delivery of operational outcomes. The empirical enquiry takes place in the context of the delivery of London Heathrow Terminal 2. Through
an inductive theory building approach drawing upon semi-structured interviews with client-side project leadership, internal documents, publicly
available data and ongoing engagement with the ﬁeld, we identiﬁed three key capability-enabling mechanisms that help explain the genesis of
project capabilities in inter-organisational settings: (1) reconfiguring project capabilities, (2) adapting project capabilities and (3) maintaining
project capabilities. We discuss and expand these ﬁndings by engaging with theoretical ideas from project studies, and mainstream strategy,
organisation, and management research to induce a dynamic model that can be helpful to guide future research, policy and management practices
relating to the client side management of project capabilities.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Project scholarship abounds with empirical evidence suggesting
that projects can succeed in meeting their specified deliverables,
but then fail to meet the envisioned operational and use benefits
(Morris and Hough, 1987; Flyvbjerg, 2009). This should not
necessarily come as a surprise, given that operational performance
of business systems and benefit realisation are often defined over
time-scales of a different order of magnitude from those in project
planning, design, and delivery. Surprisingly enough, however,
experience in the delivery of major projects is also fraught with⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: v.zerjav@ucl.ac.uk (V. Zerjav).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2018.01.004
0263-7863/0 © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open acces/0  examples of projects that failed to fulfil even the basic operational
and use expectations immediately post-handover. In its extreme
form, a failed delivery can lead to ‘a white elephant’ - a liability and
embarrassment, rather than an asset for the client's business. One
example of such a project was the ‘Millennium Experience’ that
was a year-long exhibition located ‘Millennium Dome’ in London
to celebrate the year 2000, but had to be closed after only one year
of being open to the public because of the failure to achieve the
visitor numbers and income required to sustain the operations
(NAO, 2000).
To avoid this type of situation, clients and owners/operators
of both corporate and public projects should possess capabil-
ities for transforming tangible project outputs (e.g., software,
built assets) into long-term operational and service outcomes (e.s article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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et al., 2008). The issue of achieving the transformational
capability to transition one-off or small batch projects into day-
to-day business operations is the main focus of this paper.
Part of the problem is of pragmatic nature, namely projects
and operations are traditionally seen as distinct organisational
activities (Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). While a project is a one-off
structure and activity which dissolves when its goal is
accomplished, an operation is an ongoing organisational and
productive activity, such as providing consumer with
standardised goods and services (Lundin and Söderholm,
1995). Project Management as a set of practices and as a
professional discipline has been historically focusing on the
delivery of project outputs and much less (if at all) on the
broader strategic and operational issues that organisations are
facing (Morris et al., 2012; Edkins et al., 2013; Davies, 2017).
As a result of this execution-focused mind-set, the smooth
project handover and operational delivery is seen as less of a
core activity for project teams, who, more often than not, are
incentivised to move on to other projects as soon as they have
delivered the outputs stipulated in the project brief. In other
words, the responsibility of project teams finishes when project
outputs are ‘pushed over the line’ into the domain of the client/
owner who then assumes ownership of the asset (and any
operational disruption that comes along with it).
Extant theoretical work on project organisations has
emphasised the importance of ‘project capabilities’ (Brady
and Davies, 2004; Davies et al., 2006; Nightingale et al., 2011;
Davies and Brady, 2016; Winch and Leiringer, 2016), defined
as the ability of firms to deliver projects as the core of their
business model. Such capabilities have been recognised as key
for the management of projects “through its life from the front-
end engagement with clients and sponsors, through tendering
and project delivery, to the back-end hand-over to the customer
and provision of on-going support” (Davies and Brady, 2000).
Recent project studies acknowledge that project capabilities are
either embedded in firms themselves, but can also be accessed
through ecosystems of actors participating in the delivery of
projects across domains of projects and programmes, project-
based firms, and owner-operator organisations (Winch, 2014).
Recent work on project capabilities also began taking on board
literature on dynamic capabilities to explicate, for instance, how
dynamic capabilities are developed to support the strategic
management of projects (Davies et al., 2016). Despite the
growing body of work making the connections between project
and strategic management literature on capabilities (i.e. project
vs dynamic capabilities), there is currently no research into how
the project capabilities are assembled and enacted to deliver
operational services. The aim of this article is therefore to
respond to this call by developing a more nuanced understand-
ing of the key mechanisms and practices, within which clients
assemble project capabilities within temporary inter-
organisational settings.
We therefore posit the research question for this enquiry as:
How do clients assemble and enact project capabilities for
delivering operational outcomes in inter-organisational
settings?To advance the argument about the project capabilities for
the delivery of operational outcomes, we note the importance of
the back end of projects and the ‘transition to operations’,
which is where the operational outcomes in inter-organisational
settings are realised. Nonetheless, while scholars have identi-
fied both the importance of transitions between phases within a
project (Lundin and Söderholm, 1995) as well as the challenges
of project handover and transition into operations (Morgan et
al., 2008), empirical studies into project handovers are few and
far in between (Whyte et al., 2016; Winch and Leiringer, 2016).
Existing work, for instance, elaborates the data handover
practices within a limited window of time (Whyte et al., 2016)
and the aftermath of a failed handover and operational delivery
(Brady and Davies, 2010). These studies are important as they
begin to unpack some of the project capabilities that are
necessary not only to deliver but transform projects to their
long-term operational and use existence. The identified paucity
of research into operational drivers and their implications for
projects (Davies et al., 2009, 2016; Brady and Davies, 2010;
Whyte et al., 2016; Winch and Leiringer, 2016) in the context
of the systems lifecycle approach, which integrates strategic,
delivery, and operational considerations into a multi-domain
decision-making continuum (Edkins et al., 2013; Morris, 2013;
Artto et al., 2016; Matinheikki et al., 2016), provided this study
with the theoretical basis to better understand the capability-
driven processes for the delivery and transition of projects in a
multi-organisational setting.
Building upon the above body of work and conceptual
ideas, we present this study as an inductive enquiry that
proceeds as follows. In the following section, we discuss a
selected body of relevant scholarly work on capabilities in both
project and strategic management literature. We then introduce
the setting for the empirical work in this paper: the handover
and operational delivery of London Heathrow Terminal 2 –
The Queen's Terminal, the overall success of which was
heavily dependent on the successful transition of project
outputs (building the airport terminal with its accompanying
systems) into service outcomes (using the asset to provide
seamless air travel operations for passengers and airlines) from
day one of operations. We continue by presenting findings of
the inductive analysis of interviews with mainly client-side
project leadership representatives and other rich data collected
in an engaged scholarship effort. Finally, we discuss the
implications of understanding the role of project capabilities in
balancing stability and change by formulating a dynamic
grounded model that can be helpful to guide future research as
well as policy and management practices relating to the
management of project capabilities for the delivery of
operational outcomes in projects.
2. Capabilities and organisational routines in projects
The concept of project capabilities was originally introduced
to show that Chandler's (1990) understanding of organisational
capabilities needed to be modified to address productive
activities undertaken through projects. Chandler identified two
levels – strategic and functional organisational capabilities in
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neglected to identify the capabilities required to compete and
grow successfully in industries that rarely, if ever, move into
high-volume production. Davies and Brady (2000) argued that
project capabilities are essential for the competitive advantage
of capital goods industries such as aerospace, railway
infrastructure and large-scale construction that design and
produce complex products and systems as one-offs or in small
batches for large businesses, government or institutional
customers.
The basic building blocks of capabilities – including project
capabilities – are organisational routines, often understood as
their micro-foundational patterns (Zollo and Winter, 2002;
Winter, 2013). Strategic management literature, on the other
hand, is clear that ad hoc problem solving and improvisation
does not constitute an organisational capability (Winter, 2003).
Research on project capabilities historically drew upon various
theoretical perspectives associated with dynamic capabilities
(Teece et al., 1997) including two main streams of research: the
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991) and
evolutionary theory (Nelson and Winter, 1982), with the
majority of research being grounded in the RBV perspective.
In their foundational paper, Teece et al. (1997) argued that
dynamic capabilities enable top management to purposefully
adapt, integrate and reconfigure internal and external resources
and routines in novel ways to deal with evolving technology,
market and regulatory environments (see also Teece, 2007). At
the same time, building on Nelson and Winter (1982),
evolutionary theory develops a “dual-routines” perspective.
Located in the dual-level managerial hierarchy of the firm,
dynamic capabilities – similar to strategic capabilities – are
located at the strategic level and used by top management to
modify, recombine and create operational capabilities and
routines in a changing environment. Operational capabilities, in
turn, are relied upon to coordinate and perform a firm's day-to-
day productive or functional activities (Zollo and Winter, 2002;
Helfat and Peteraf, 2003).
More recent research has developed the idea that dynamic
capabilities play a balancing role in keeping pace with a range
of environmental conditions, both stable and rapidly changing.
Firms need to adopt ambidextrous organisational designs,
which will allow them to both explore new and exploit existing
opportunities (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008; Turner et al.,
2015). O'Reilly and Tushman (2008) argue that organisational
ambidexterity – the ability to simultaneously exploit a firm's1 Strategic capabilities refer to senior management skills and learned routines
needed to support strategic planning, diversiﬁcation decisions and coordination
of functional activities. Strategic capabilities are a source of competitive
advantage because they are used to respond to moves by competitors, to
innovate by moving into new technologies and market positions, and adapt to a
changing environment. Functional capabilities refer to the day-to-day
operations performed by the ﬁrm including production, distribution, purchas-
ing, ﬁnance and general management. Firms rely on functional capabilities to
grow successfully and obtain economies of scale and scope by moving from
low to high-volume production.current routines for existing customers and explore new
opportunities that will define the future – is a form of dynamic
capability. The convergence of the ambidexterity and dynamic
capability underpins conversations about business models and
business model innovation (Teece, 2010; Baden-Fuller and
Haefliger, 2013).
Informed by an evolutionary perspective on dynamic
capabilities, Davies and Brady (2016) develop a dual-routines
perspective arguing that project capabilities consist of a
collection of routines (alongside functional capabilities) that
can be conceived as subset of a firm's lower-order operational
capabilities. A distinction is made between routine and
innovative projects to show how project capabilities connect
to work on dynamic capabilities and ambidexterity. Routine
projects exploit a firm's existing knowledge, utilise proven
technologies and mature products, and address current cus-
tomer needs and known market conditions. They depend on
traditional forms of project management to achieve predefined
goals within given resource constraints. Innovative projects, by
contrast, explore innovative alternatives, new ideas and
approaches, and create novel markets and technologies. Firms
rely on dynamic capabilities to allocate resources and manage
their project capabilities consisting of a portfolio of routine and
innovative projects (Davies and Brady, 2016). Dynamic
capabilities are employed by senior managers to know how
and when existing project capabilities should be exploited
under relatively stable and predictable technology and market
conditions. Established project capabilities may, however, have
to be radically revised to keep up with changing and
unpredictable conditions or when an innovative project is
established to create new technologies, products or services.
Research has also shown how firms depend on dynamic
capabilities to balance and transition from innovative to routine
projects (e.g., Brady and Davies, 2004).
This paper responds to the recent call for more research on
how project capabilities are deployed to deal with the variety of
conditions contained within a single large and complex project
(Winch, 2014; Davies and Brady, 2016; Davies et al., 2016;
Winch and Leiringer, 2016). Prior research has identified the
strategic, commercial, and governance capabilities that infra-
structure owner/operators require to manage projects (Winch
and Leiringer, 2016) and the project capabilities required to
support handover digital information along with physical assets
to operators and end users (Lobo and Whyte, 2017).
Organisations – clients, owner/operators and delivery
partners – depend on dynamic and project capabilities to deal
with the variety of conditions, stable and unpredictable,
encountered during a project life cycle extending from the
front-end planning, through execution to the handover of an
operational asset. We selected the handover stage in a large,
complex project as the empirical setting for this research, to
study how dynamic and project capabilities are deployed to
balance the need to perform stable routines, whilst dealing with
unforeseeable events. In this way, project handover can be
understood as the critical intersection of dynamic and
operational capabilities, to enable the transformation of project
outputs into use outcomes.
2 Up till 2012, British Midland International (BMI) had its operational base in
Heathrow and it ﬂew to various international destinations.
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In order to learn about the role of project capabilities for the
delivery of project outcomes and their transition into long-term
business operations, we chose to undertake an inductive,
interpretive, qualitative enquiry (Gioia et al., 2013; Eisenhardt
et al., 2016) based on a single case (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Eisenhardt
and Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2013). The reasoning behind
choosing this approach is because we wanted to explore not
generally how client organisations enact project capabilities to
deliver operationally successful projects, but what can we
specifically learn from those owner/operators who excel at it.
Our reasoning is underpinned by the acknowledgement that
management and organisation studies should focus on outliers
rather than averages (McKelvey, 2006) in order to generate
useful and insightful research outcomes. We chose to
implement a qualitative and inductive research design that
would enable revelatory yet rigorous analysis (Gioia et al.,
2013; Eisenhardt et al., 2016) of the organisational practices, as
they were reported and co-created with project leadership
practitioners (Van de Ven, 2007).
The setting for this research is the London Heathrow Airport
transformation programme as an epitome of a large
organisational undertaking, in which the delivery can be seen
as battling through complexity and uncertainty to deliver value
to users and infrastructure operators (Lenfle and Loch, 2016).
Moreover, problems that occur during the transition to airport
operations can rapidly change the public perception of an
otherwise successful project. One of the notable examples of
such a situation is the hugely disrupted start-up of Heathrow
Terminal 5 in 2008 due to the poor coordination between BAA,
the airport owner, and British Airways, the eventual occupier of
the new building (Brady and Davies, 2010).
The specific case chosen for the empirical enquiry comprises
the project handover and operational delivery of London
Heathrow Terminal 2 (T2) – also titled as The Queen's
Terminal, through which the project organisation moved into
the operations phase of the airport system lifecycle. The
methodological justification for the selection of the handover of
Heathrow T2 as the case to inform this enquiry is the “extreme”
or “critical” case argument (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Siggelkow, 2007;
Yin, 2013). We argue for at least three points that justify the
criticality that warrants a single-case approach.
First, Heathrow Airport Limited (HAL) as the client
organisation (formerly known as the British Airports Authority)
faced substantial operational disruption upon the opening of its
previous flagship infrastructure project Terminal 5 in March
2008. Since the opening of T2 was in the public spotlight and
closely scrutinised by the UK government, the owner/operator
simply could not afford the project to be seen as anything less
than “the best practice” for an airport opening. Second and
noting the previous point, the T2 project experienced a major
disruption during its early execution, which motivated adapta-
tion in response (this point is elaborated in more detail in the
Case Context section). Finally, the project handover involved a
major Operational Readiness (OR) dedicated effort to facilitate
the successful operational delivery of the project. Whereas eachof these is a feature of significant interest, when combined with
the scale (£2.4bn), the nationally critical role of the project, as
well as being part of a major international hub airport, it
justifies the selection of the case study on the basis of its critical
(extreme) features. Moreover, selecting the T2 handover and
transition as a case enabled us to study this unique setting in
rich depth and uncover key mechanisms that might help
researchers expand the understanding of the role that project
capabilities play for the delivery and transition of projects as a
combination of dynamic and operational capabilities.
In so doing, we adopted a social-constructivist view (Gioia
et al., 2013) in an effort to co-produce descriptions of senior
project leadership's meanings and definitions of the T2 project
handover situation (Gephart, 2004). The case is therefore
revelatory (Gioia et al., 2013), enabling the exploration of how
project capabilities are assembled in through the rich empirical
context of project handover and transition.
3.1. Case context
Heathrow Terminal 2 (T2), at the time of conducting the
research, was an ongoing airport reconstruction project worth
£2.4 billion (2014 prices). The Terminal began operating on 4
June 2014 and was officially opened as The Queen's Terminal by
HM The Queen on 23 June 2014. Passenger experience and
environmental sustainability are claimed as some of the key
distinguishing features of the new airport terminal. Other
distinctive features include the common multi-airline check-in
area, self-boarding gates, as well as a variety of innovative
solutions in architectural, structural, and process design. When it
opened, the terminal hosted 26 airlines, comprising all 23 Star
Alliance airlines, plus Air Lingus, Virgin Atlantic Little Red and
Germanwings as non-alliance airlines. T2 was designed across a
footprint of 40,000 square meters, to accommodate around 22
million passengers annually, or around 43,000 passengers on 324
flights per day. The passengers are served by 28 gates, eight
A380 piers, 60 check-in desks and 66 self-service kiosks. In
addition, there are 33 shops, 17 restaurants, 634 toilets, 1340 car
parking spaces and 7106 seats in the terminal. T2 comprises two
major buildings: T2A and T2B. T2A was designed by Luis Vidal
and Architects and was built by a joint venture of Ferrovial and
Laing O'Rourke. T2Bwas designed by GrimshawArchitects and
constructed by Balfour Beatty. Early design commenced in 2006
with the first on site construction in 2010 having started after the
old T2 building was demolished in 2009.
Besides its national and international importance and its
sheer scale and complexity, it is important to note that the
project was taking place in the midst of the fast-paced aviation
industry, in which mergers and acquisitions and frequent
changes in airline business models are as common as regulatory
changes in immigration and security policies. The delivery
phase of T2 was no exception in that regard as it experienced a
disruption when the public announcement was made (Financial
Times, 2012) that British Midland International (BMI)2 - the
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time of drawing up the contract and until that point - had been
acquired by the International Airlines Group3 (IAG) with the
consequence that all BMI operations were to be integrated with
British Airways (BA) shortly thereafter. Given that Heathrow
Terminal 5 is BA's main hub and base of operations, the main
consequence of this merger was that BMI was going to move its
operations to a different terminal, leaving T2 without its main
occupier. As a consequence of the unexpected acquisition of
BMI, HAL developed and then negotiated a solution in which
the new T2 was going to accommodate 23 of the Star Alliance
(SA) airlines – a first for any major airport hub. To fully
occupy the T2 space, three non-Alliance airlines: Air Lingus,
Virgin Atlantic Little Red and Germanwings carriers would
also be accommodated. Because these SA airlines were
previously spread across other terminals of Heathrow, SA
effectively became the lead occupier of the T2 building, with
the goal of ultimately serving 22 million passengers per year
from a single hub terminal. The business value-add for the SA
to occupy the terminal was in the operational and commercial
benefits of the hub-and-spoke model of operations. In other
words, members of the alliance would enjoy the benefits of
being collocated in a single terminal by improving the quality
of service and opportunity for cross-selling of products of the
SA member airlines. This situation led to a fundamental review
of which airlines would occupy both T2 and the other terminals
at Heathrow, the result of which was a substantial
reorganisation of the project further described in the Findings
section.
By the same token, motivated by its experience of
operational deliveries (particularly the disrupted operational
handover of T5) the project's leadership from the owner/
operator's organisation commissioned an independent review
from a leading international consultancy on lessons learned
from various airport openings worldwide. The result was that
the management team responsible for the transition between the
construction project and business-as-usual operations played a
major role in the project. This was achieved through a dedicated
Operational Readiness (OR) sub-organisation comprising a
team that grew to be more than 300 people. The rationale for
such a dedicated organisation was that the client (HAL) had
previous experience of the sub-optimal opening of T5, which
had major issues when it opened and caused significant
reputational damage as a result. After considering the lessons
learned from T5, for T2 HAL established an operational team in
place two years before the opening date with a strategic focus
on passenger experience once the terminal went live. A central
focus was on the effort of organising a series of staged user
trials during the construction of the terminal. As opposed to
more simplistic technical testing of devices, the trials involved
people and were organised in a succession going from trialling
the use of specific physical units to entire putting pretend or
proxy passengers and their luggage in large areas in a
progressively complex effort. The project involved 192 trials3 International Airlines Group (AIG) is currently the holding company of Aer
Lingus, British Airways, Iberia and Vueling.with a familiarisation program culminating in around 3000
people in the final trials. The pinnacle of the trials was an
unannounced live flight arriving just before the official opening
on the 4 June 2014. In spite of all the challenges and
complexity outlined above, the airport opening was widely
perceived as entirely successful, with various public media
making references that attribute the successful opening to the
“soft launch” strategy that was implemented in the project, as
compared to the ‘big bang’ full opening of T5 (Financial Times,
2014).3.2. Data collection
Data collection is based upon two key forms of primary
data: semi-structured interviews and structured practitioner
engagement with senior project leadership members in the
client/owner organisation, together with secondary data. This
was conducted over a period of six months during 2014 where
all three authors engaged with the project leadership practi-
tioners (Van de Ven, 2007). Our goal was to collect rich data as
to examine project leadership perceptions of their lived
experiences associated with the assembly and enactment of
project capabilities for project delivery, handover and transition
so as to build novel theoretical and practitioner-oriented
insights (Gioia et al., 2013).
We approached a variety of key informants in Heathrow
Airport Limited (HAL), the project client organisation, to
interview them about key routines around the (successful)
operational delivery of the project. Our presumption was that
addressing organisational routines as the unit of analysis (Zollo
and Winter, 2002; Pentland and Feldman, 2005) would reveal
the key features of how the project capabilities were assembled
in the temporary inter-organisational setting as the empirical
setting of this study. The interactions with representatives of
project leadership were in the form of a series of in-depth semi-
structured interviews (Spradley, 1979) with selected individual
informants. In setting up the research study, we followed
guidance on speaking as a mode of practice (Marshall, 2014)
and let the informants enact key concepts through speech. The
key informants were selected from different levels of client-side
project leadership team primarily focusing on (1) management,
(2) organisational units, and (3) technical systems teams (e.g.,
buildings, baggage handling, and information and communica-
tion systems). The informants were selected through “snowball
sampling” whereby we made the entry into the organisation
through the head of the Operational Readiness team and then
requested additional key contacts in other teams relevant for
studying aspects of the operational delivery of the airport. As a
result, the initial list of informants expanded as the interviews
were being conducted. With minor discrepancies, each
interview was structured similarly and lasted in the range
between a minimum of 45 min and a maximum of 2.5 h. All
but three interviews were attended by all three authors, who
contributed to the interview protocol and took notes indepen-
dently in order to strengthen the internal validity of data and its
interpretation.
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interview notes to try to identify the most prominent emergent
categories and themes. This also represented the beginning of
the data analysis effort. We continued to conduct subsequent
interviews until reaching the point of saturation where we
reflected and concluded that significant new features were no
longer being reported (O'Reilly and Parker, 2013). All
interviews were digitally audio-recorded with informants'
consent, which resulted in a total of 17 h and 10 min of audio
recorded material that was subsequently transcribed to allow for
a rigorous data analysis effort (Corbin and Strauss, 2008).
Table 1 gives an overview of the in-depth interview accounts.
Besides semi-structured interviews, we also engaged with
the practitioners through a number of structured activities,
which contributed to the rich data collection (Van de Ven,
2007). For example, we organised a group feedback workshop
to present and discuss preliminary findings with interested
members of the owner/operator organisation. The session was
held on 19 November 2014 and hosted a total of 13 participants
alongside the researchers. The duration of the validation
workshop was 1.5 h, which was split into an extensive
presentation of the ongoing research followed by a feedback
session and an open discussion about pathways to improve the
operational delivery of future projects using emerging findings
from the ongoing research. We also attended a number of
research meetings with senior owner/operator representatives to
discuss emergent findings. One of the outcomes of this
engagement effort was the launch of a postgraduate module
within the authors' institution on the transformation of projectsTable 1
Project leadership informants in the semi-structured interviews.
Informant Role on project
Interview session 1: 28 May 2014
Sally Blackwell Head of operational readiness
Interview session 2: 24 June 2014
Bally Grewal IT programme director T2
Richard Walker Managed service provider lead T2A
Mark Dunn Operational readiness manager
Duncan Pickard Project director T2A
Interview session 3: 26 June 2014
Steve Anderson Project controls manager
Ciaran Creamer Baggage systems delivery project mana
Andy Garner Airline readiness director T2
Karen Yorath Delivery manager T2A
Andy Limb Information and communication system
Jason Cowell Delivery lead T2A
Interview session 4: 1 July 2014
Tony Court Construction director T2A
Phil Jones Information and communication system
delivery management
Interview session 5: 10 July 2014
Brian Woodhead Operations director T2
Graeme Ross Systems integration & baggage IT man
Interview session 6: 4 December 2014
Steve Anderson Projects controls manager
Gavin Payne Business change managerinto operations on the basis of this research. Finally, we
attended and contributed to a dedicated event on the delivery on
T2 organised by an external professional body. Secondary data
that fed into the analysis critically included two externally
generated reports on lessons learned in the delivery of the
project and relevant project documentation such as schedules
and PowerPoint presentations on various aspects of the
handover. Such a variety of data sources combined with the
deep engagement with the field has been reported to lend itself
to an insightful inductive theory building (Gioia et al., 2013).
3.3. Data analysis
Drawing upon interview transcripts, notes, and secondary
sources, we analysed the rich data following the relatively well-
known “Gioia” method for inductive theory building in
organisation research. The coding strategy comprises a two-
step analytical routine moving from informant-centric (1st
order) to theory-centric (2nd order) constructs with the aim of
developing a dynamic grounded theory explaining the phe-
nomenon under observation (Gioia et al., 2013). The first data
analysis stage in the protocol is the 1st order coding effort,
where we focused on identifying key categories that encapsu-
lated the features that informants attributed to the organisational
routines that led to successful operational delivery of the project
(and consequently, the enactment of the project capabilities for
operational outcomes in an inter-organisational setting). The
second stage of the protocol warrants a comprehensive
literature overview and ‘constant comparison’ of the first-Organisation
Heathrow Airport Limited (HAL)
HAL
Consultant to HAL
HAL
HAL
HAL
ger Contractor
HAL
HAL
s delivery lead T2 HAL
HAL
Contractor
s HAL
HAL
ager HAL
HAL
HAL
450 V. Zerjav et al. / International Journal of Project Management 36 (2018) 444–459order (theory-free) concepts with theoretical ideas that will
drive the analytical process towards the 2nd order theoretical
constructs. In this stage, we extensively engaged with the
literature on projects, strategic management and organisation
studies, to identify concepts that might have relevance in
driving forward the research agenda on how project capabilities
are assembled for the operational delivery of projects in an
inter-organisational setting. This led to the development of the
2nd order themes and - as a further step - overarching
theoretical dimensions, as key capability-enabling mechanisms
for operational outcomes. It must be mentioned that whenever
reached a low level of agreement in understanding of the
particular coding, the data was revisited, the different
interpretations reconciled so as to arrive to a consensual code
label. At the same token, we made sure to validate the link
between the 1st order, 2nd order, and aggregate concepts by
discussing the practical implications of the theoretical ideas that
were emerging so as to maintain the thread of 1st order findings
and categories translating into 2nd order themes and – further -
overarching theoretical dimensions. Doing this enabled us to
achieve a high level of inter-coder alignment and agreement.
The final step in the protocol was to translate the above
described data structure into a dynamic grounded theory model
that explicates how the different analytical categories come
together in an organisational setting. We developed such a
model drawing upon the ‘thick narrative’ that the single case
context enables. This allowed us to (1) develop what we believe
are revelatory findings about the management and governance
of project capabilities for operational outcomes in inter-
organisational settings, an area clearly identified as sparsely
explored and, (2) ‘open up’ a future research agenda using the
project back-end as the empirical setting. This reasoning drove
the overall coding and data structure shown in Fig. 1 and Table
2 in Appendix 1. Moreover, because we disclosed the roles of
the group of senior informants who contributed to this research,
all the quotes are reported in a non-attributable format for
confidentiality purposes.
4. Findings
To translate the field notes into 1st order categories and 2nd
order themes, we mainly consulted literature in project studies and
strategic management, referring to capabilities literature which was
relevant to describe the client's perspective we were interested to
learn more about. We next discuss these findings along the lines of
three overarching theoretical dimensions, which directly translate
into key capability-enabling mechanisms: (1) Reconfiguring
project capabilities, which was about the need for the project to
learn from previous decisions made in the given organisational
context; (2) adapting project capabilities, which is about the need
and ability of the project to respond and adapt to the external
environmental conditions while still adhering to its original brief;
and (3) maintaining project capabilities, which we found to be an
important mechanism in how project teams and leadership
developed new routines that allowed them to improvise while
continuing to work in face of uncertainty and change. In presenting
the findings, we will focus on a brief outline of each keymechanism for brevity purposes. This brevity implies that we
chose not use informant quotes in presenting the overarching
dimensions (key capability-enabling mechanisms), but include
them as Appendix 1 (table of dimensions, themes, categories and
data).4.1. Reconfiguring project capabilities
“Nothing new on T2!”
The first capability-enabling mechanism that emerged as an
aggregate dimension from the informant accounts was related to
the historical and organisational context in which the delivery of
the project was taking place. Informantsmade numerous references
to the delivery of the owner/occupier's previous flagship project -
T5. Although few of the project leadership representatives
interviewed had worked on T5, it was clear that history mattered
and in the high importance that was given to successful handover
of the project to operations. This also meant that the owner/
operator organisation has put so much emphasis on the
management of the handover that they gauged the success of the
entire project in relation to that. “No news is good news” in terms
of journalistic headlines was both the aspiration and hope of project
leadership as the opening date approached.
We found that the reconfiguring of project capabilities based
on organisational learning was key to this process. Heathrow is
an international hub airport that accommodated 75.7 million
passengers in 2016. The criticality of the role that this
infrastructure asset performs for the UK national economy is
difficult to overestimate. At the same time, the delivery of the
strategic pipeline of projects for this client has had a track
record that sets a high bar in terms of delivery and operational
performance. Being the successor of T5 – widely perceived to
be a successful project despite the problematic opening – had a
particularly powerful effect of framing the expectations in
terms of delivery and opening. The unavoidable exposure to
public media was significant and the owner/occupier simply
could not afford any kind of perceived failure either during the
delivery or upon commencement of operations of the project.
This had led to a risk-averse strategy in the handover of T2.
This meant a careful consideration of the operational factors
early in the project and the establishment of the Operational
Readiness (OR) organisation six months out from the opening
date as an intermediary stage to integrate the project with long-
term operations and to cross the critical point on the opening
day. Different aspects of the OR organisation will be covered in
the subsequent overarching dimensions/capability-enabling
mechanisms.
The other important factor to consider is the reputational risk
that the owner/occupier would have faced upon an unsuccessful
completion and handover of the terminal. For business reasons,
it was in the interest of the owner/occupier to deliver the most
innovative and cutting edge technological and service solutions
alongside this terminal. Solutions such as the hub-and-spoke
business model, automated boarding gates, and self-check-in
process, were part of this mix. Competing in the cut-throat
market of air transportation, it was important for the owner
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Fig. 1. Data and coding structure.
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project in relation to the comparable airports within the same
catchment area. This meant that decisions were not only being
framed within the bounds of the organisation itself but how
they relate to ‘the outside world’.
To summarise the capability-enabling mechanism of
reconfiguring project capabilities, we contend that past
organisational decisions and experience had an important role in
project delivery and transition to operations. The handover of this
project had to both deliver against very high expectations in terms
of the time-cost-quality outputs, while defeating the expectations of
a problematic opening and handover to operations as the main
service outcomes. The result, amongst other interventions, was the
delivery and transition strategy by establishing OR as a dedicated
organisation. We finally argue that the reconfiguring of project
capabilities explains the project delivery strategy that in the case
project expressly aimed to reduce uncertainty in the handover. This
was reportedly embedded into the organisational culture from the
onset of the project delivery as can be seen from the table of quotes
in Appendix 1.
4.2. Adapting project capabilities
“At that point, it was clear that we could not work as
before.”The second capability-enabling mechanism that emerged as
an aggregate dimension from the informant accounts related to
how the project responded to an unforeseen event - the BMI
merger – and the change from having to accommodate the shift
from one airline to 26 airline occupiers.
A process had to be created and enacted at short notice to
move the various airlines to T2 from other terminals of
Heathrow. The new hub-and-spoke model also required
redesigning the aircraft ground handling and check-in processes
in the terminal building. As a response, informants reported a
number of innovative solutions that were implemented in the
project in order to accommodate the need for the changes in the
project brief. One of such solutions refers to how the project
team dealt with the new requirements for the check-in area,
originally designed and built to accommodate predominantly
one airline, but now having to accommodate 26 different
airlines, many of which with very different check-in proce-
dures. It became clear that a new solution was needed and it
was sought in the form of increasing the efficiency of
individual counters. This led to the concept of the common
check-in where more airlines would share the same self-check-
in kiosks. By designing check-in kiosks capable of dealing with
customers from many different airlines, it would be possible to
accommodate the significant increase in the number of airlines
operating from the terminal. The check-in process was
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online check-in, self-tagging, and self-check-in.
At the same time, organising the airline moves in these
conditions and against the non-negotiable opening date was a
significant challenge for the management of the project. The
change in the check-in processes in particular had a significant
impact on the airlines as not all of them had the business models,
processes and information technology in place to accommodate
the new requirement for the common check-in, despite the fact
that the airlines were members of the same alliance. This, in turn,
meant that HAL needed to work together with the airlines to
support them in their moves into the new terminal. The airline
moves strategy was arranged in the way that the airlines were
encouraged to fulfil both the business- and systems-related
requirements first before being granted permission to move into
the new terminal. The particular challenge was facilitating the
adoption of the common check-in process for the different
airlines. The client organisation set up a process whereby the
airlines were requested to demonstrate 10 capabilities in a
gateway process over a period of 12 months before the particular
move was performed. This involved a formal sign-off process by
the responsible persons in charge. Finally, the entire airline
moves effort was facilitated against a number of dates, some of
which were more and some less flexible. The airport opening date
of 4th June was the key event, working back from which a
number of preceding activities were put in place extending well
back into the construction phase of the terminal.
The above vignette articulates the second key mechanism that
emerged as an overarching dimension in the coding. The project
was exposed to significant pressure through the changing external
environment, having a knock-on effect on a variety of domains
within the project delivery domain. This has generated a response
in the form of various adaptation strategies but at the same time has
presented opportunities for innovation. The challenges of having to
arrange a number of substantial airline moves and redesign the
check-in process and the ground handling contractual arrangement,
were all seen as both major unexpected challenges as well as
serendipitous opportunities for novel solutions. In fact, many of the
key innovative features of the terminal as an operating asset were
reported to be a result of ‘coping creatively’ with the challenges
and the need for project reconstitution, adaptation and alignment.
To summarise on adapting project capabilities, we propose
that the idea explains the ability of the project in the delivery
phase of the lifecycle to address uncertainty while at the same
time appreciating that the role of the project was to introduce
controlled change into an ongoing stable business, by
delivering specific and expected outputs on time and on budget.4.3. Maintaining project capabilities
“We know we've been here for our proving trials. We know
we've been here on our training. We've done proving trials
of volumes. We've done a live flight.”
The third capability-enabling mechanism that emerged in the
qualitative coding related to organising the OR and theprocesses and routines of its enactment at the back-end of the
project. OR was set up to avoid the calamitous openings of
many international airports. The operations team made the
strategic decision to implement a “soft launch” opening with
sufficient buffers in the airport capacity to accommodate any
unforeseen events. They wanted to achieve a formal opening
that would be a media anti-climax and “non-event” in
journalistic headline terms. The period subsequent to the
opening was, moreover, planned as a gradual ramp-up period
of six months where the airport's operations would be scaled up
to smoothly reach its full operating capacity allowing for
sufficient time to adapt the processes to the new setting. Based
the lessons derived from previous experiences of airport
openings, the client management team planned for a specific
moment in the project timeline when the organisational and
legal ownership of the project would be handed over from the
construction and development team to the operations team.
This starting point of the transition from the project to
operations was referred to by the informants as ‘the flip’.
Before the flip, the construction team was in charge of the
project and after this symbolic date the operations team assumed
responsibility for the project. This was a clear paradigm shift on the
project as, in the terms of a construction project, emphasis would
have been on the commissioning processes, normally defined in
terms of milestones to make sure all the technical systems are in
place, tested and certified, and the facility is therefore deemed
technically ready to be handed over to the operators. However, in
operational terms, technical testing is only the starting point for a
much more extensive process involving staged trials with the
purpose of simulating operationally live environments within a
functioning airport. Given the time overlap between the comple-
tion of all construction activities and the commencement of OR
activities, managing this transition was fraught with complexity
and unexpected events during the back-end of the project. It was
recognised that there would be the need to learn from the feedback
gained from the trials which progressed gradually from simple and
specific to larger, more frequent, comprehensive and sophisticated
activities. The gradual increase of the operational complexity of
the trials was meant to address different scales of user and operator
interactions in the airport as an operating asset.
The organisations involved in the transition between ‘the
flip’ and the airport opening were dealing with high levels of
uncertainty such as the numerous change requests that were
generated as the effort went on. The OR was furthermore
characterised by a significant overlap between streams of
construction and operations work in that operational activities
were developed and delivered with a progressively increasing
intensity, escalating from the construction phase to full capacity
operations. At the same time, project delivery (construction)
activities gradually decreased until the point of the operational
opening and thereafter until the airport reached its full
operational capacity.
Maintaining project capabilities implied a mind-set referred
to as “the building of progressive confidence” as the project
moved towards full operations. This progressive confidence is
characterised by establishing routines, tests and guarantees to
ensure a predictable and stable transition process, whilst
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to emergent and unexpected events that might hamper a smooth
transition. Improvisation was required only when the team
encountered challenges and expected changes as the project
unfolded.
5. Discussion: a project capability model for the delivery of
operational outcomes in inter-organisational settings
This research aimed to understand how clients assemble and
enact the project capabilities required to manage the transition
from project to operational outcome. Our findings suggest that
overarching dimensions of (1) reconfiguring, (2) adapting, and
(3) maintaining project capabilities acted as key capability-
enabling mechanisms for achieving operational outcomes in the
case setting. The most important theoretical implication of the
findings is that the dynamic and operational capabilities in
projects are much more intertwined than what traditional
literature in strategic management acknowledges. This was
evident across all three capability-enabling mechanisms, but
most obvious in the adaptation domain whereby the client
employed dynamic project capabilities to respond to the
challenge in the project environment (change of tenant),
which at the same time led to new operational-level project
capabilities (check-in procedures and baggage handling pro-
cesses). Maintaining the project capabilities meant that at the
interface of delivery and operational domains of the project,
new micro-routines had to be assembled, which was facilitated
by a mindful process of ad-hoc action and improvising. The
second implication is that learning is an underpinning
phenomenon that informs the strategic shaping of the project
in the front end. It is shaped by history and previous experience
that drive the strategic decisions. This was evident in that the
key factor for the success of the project was the seamless
delivery and operational transition of this project.
We conclude by inducing a dynamic model that integrates
the empirical findings from this study with the discussed
theoretical ideas from project studies and strategic manage-
ment. The key point in this capability-driven model for delivery
of project-based operational outcomes in temporary inter-
organisational settings is to recognise that ownership and
allocation of the resources to plan, execute and operate the
project is ultimately with firms as legal entities, not the project.
The second point is to differentiate between the project and
operations as the distinct sides of the systems lifecycle
framework. Integrating the two, the research model (Fig. 2)
identifies the lifecycle of the system across three main phases of
project activity: the (1) front-end planning, (2) project
execution and (3) operations and use.
The front-end phase is characterised by planning and
strategic decisions amongst a variety of stakeholders. This
stage both draws upon and feeds into dynamic project
capabilities, helping the client's firm to give birth to the
project. Reconfiguring of project capabilities mainly occurs in
this stage, which in our case was by shaping the project through
organisational experience and learning. What follows is the
project execution stage where the delivery teams are workingon outputs to fulfil the project brief. The stability of project
capabilities is a dominant feature of this phase and their
adaptation is required only when conditions change unexpect-
edly. In the case project this happened through accommodating
the project externalities by employing dynamic project
capabilities and introducing new (operational) project capabil-
ities. At the same time, delivery stage also incurs most of the
(capital) costs that project value will have to be offset against. It
is this stage that draws upon and feeds into the core project
capabilities, as understood in a traditional sense, which enable
the owner/operator to deliver a variety of projects core to its
business. The final stage in the systems lifecycle model of
project capabilities is operations and use, whereby the
constructed asset is deployed, providing long-term services.
Maintaining of project capabilities is a key feature of this phase.
In the case project this occurred through the process of
‘building of progressive confidence’, whereby routines were
built to support the gradual transition from delivery to
operational mode of organising.
Key to this process was the transformation of the management
structure, in the case project referred to as ‘the flip’. Whereas
before the flip, organisation was considered in project terms, after
the flip it was considered in terms of operations and use. This
gradual transition also represents a critical point where project
outputs are gradually starting to be translated into service
outcomes. Using a metaphor to illustrate the role of this
‘transition to operations’ phase, we would like to compare it to
the importance of rehearsals in a performance context, whereby
success is facilitated with a degree of ad-hoc action while
responding to the ongoing situation and interactions.
The dynamic grounded model demonstrates how project
capabilities are brought together and enacted to manage the
transition from the project to a set of operational outcomes in an
inter-organisational setting. This is a result of continuous
interplay between client-held dynamic and operational capabil-
ities feeding upon each other and being translated from the
project to the firm level and back to the project (Davies and
Brady, 2016). Unpacking the project organisation for delivery
and transition of the case project, this study revealed three
domains of decision-making interventions corresponding to the
three key capability-enabling mechanisms: (1) strategic deci-
sions that peak at the beginning of the project and fade away as
the project moves into its execution (broadly following the
reconfiguration of project capabilities); (2) delivery decisions
that by and large encompass the project execution stage with
somewhat less relevance for the planning and operations
(broadly following the adaptation of project capabilities); and
(3) operational decisions that gain prominence towards the
back-end of project execution, peak at the beginning of the
operations and continue throughout the systems lifecycle
through to decommissioning (broadly following the mainte-
nance of project capabilities).
It is however, important to mention that despite the apparent
alignment between the capability-enabling mechanisms for
operational outcomes and distinct domains of decision-making
interventions, we cannot claim that such an alignment exists
with distinct phases of the systems lifecycle. This is because it
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Fig. 2. Project capability model for operational outcomes in inter-organisational settings.
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sively take place at the front-end of the project, delivery
decisions exclusively during the execution, and operational
decisions exclusively after the project has been delivered. In
reality, the three levels of decision-making are intertwined and
they occur simultaneously, each extending much beyond its
strictly delineated phase within the systems lifecycle. Nonethe-
less, and as illustrated in Fig. 2, we assumed that the interplay
between the different domains of management interventions
broadly feeds into the assembly of project capabilities along the
front-end planning, execution, and operations stages of the
systems lifecycle in the analysed inter-organisational setting.
Assuming that the strategic, delivery, and operational decisions
achieve most impact in the front-end, execution, and exploita-
tion stages – respectively - we believe that the above model
helps to articulate how project capabilities are assembled in the
case project, driven by the need to achieve stability in routines
with dynamic priorities.
6. Conclusions
The discussion of the findings suggests that clients can enact
project capabilities at strategic (reconfiguring project capabili-
ties), delivery (adapting project capabilities), and operational
(maintaining project capabilities) levels. The study addresses the
acknowledged conceptual tension between stability and change
in projects (Davies et al., 2016) as follows. First, the project hadto achieve a balance between conforming to the established path
of delivery expectations but at the same time it had to break out
of the negative expectations about service outcomes upon
handover. Decision-making about this aspect took place in the
strategic domain of the owner/operator organisation and the
mind-set was one of uncertainty avoidance mind-set (‘nothing
new on T2 together with a soft ‘low key’ launch model).
Second, the project needed to achieve balance between
exploiting the existing opportunities (get the project delivered
on time) but embracing opportunities for exploration and
serendipity that were the result of the (externally or internally
induced) changing requirements. Decision-making about this
aspect took place in the (project) delivery domain of the owner/
operator organisation and the mind-set was one of uncertainty
neutrality (uncertainty is both to be embraced and avoided).
Third, the project was enacting a balancing act between stability
and improvisation in that while the OR team was working
towards the handover, it was clear that reliability could only be
achieved by responding to the situation in a ‘rehearsal’ model.
This led to decisions being made at the operational level of
considering the asset. Actions taken point to an uncertainty-
embracing mind-set (uncertainty was mindfully embraced as a
feature of stability).
Although relevant for the entire lifecycle of the infrastruc-
ture system, the phenomenon took place at the level of
organisational routines (Zollo and Winter, 2002; Bresnen et
al., 2005; Helfat and Winter, 2011; Winter, 2013) corroborating
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capabilities to understand project ambidexterity as an act of
balancing stability and change in complex projects (Davies et
al., 2016). The present study contributes to project studies with
an empirical investigation of how dynamic and operational
capabilities (driven by routines) interact to shape project
capabilities for the delivery operational and use outcomes.
This contribution extends recent work on project capabilities
(Brady and Davies, 2004; Davies et al., 2006; Nightingale et
al., 2011; Davies and Brady, 2016; Winch and Leiringer, 2016)
by illustrating the client-led interaction between dynamic and
operational project capabilities using the empirical setting of
the project back-end in an inter-organisational context. The
other important contribution of the study for project scholarship
is positioning the mechanisms and processes related to the use
of project capabilities into the systems life-cycle context
(Edkins et al., 2013; Morris, 2013; Artto et al., 2016).
This work also contributes to theoretical conversations in
strategic management literature, which considers routines and
capabilities being clearly different from ad-hoc problem solving
(Winter, 2003; Teece, 2012). Our work (quite intriguingly)
suggests that, although we are focusing on project capabilities,
the mutual exclusivity between routine-based capabilities and
improvisation cannot account for the practices we observed in
our case study. In our findings, the stability and predictability
provided by project capabilities provided a space for improvi-
sation and innovation when conditions changed. This supports
recent theoretical work calling for research on the mutually
constitutive and complementary relationship between stability
and change in organisational settings (Eisenhardt et al., 2010;
Farjoun, 2010). The maintaining project capabilities mecha-
nism from our findings best illustrates how both stable routines
and ad-hoc action were at play in the case context. Albeit at a
different analytical level, this phenomenon is also corroborated
by studies arguing for organisational improvisation and its
benefits for innovation (Eisenhardt, 1997; Diasio, 2016).
As any research, this work has several limitations, which we
recognise. First, a single case has limited generalisability.
Although we appreciate the limitations of qualitative theorising
using single cases, we wanted to achieve an explanatory
contribution for the domain of project studies, shedding light
upon the subject of project capabilities for achieving opera-
tional outcomes in an inter-organisational context, identified as
important, but without a structured empirical follow-up.
Focusing on such a case allowed us to achieve the analytical
depth necessary to reveal the basic features of the phenomenon
that future studies should expand on. More specifically, the
empirical basis can be expanded by looking into multiple casesAppendix 1 Dimensions, themes, categories and data
Second-order themes and first-order categories Representative data
Key: overarching theoretical dimension/capability-enabling mechanism
N. 2nd order theme
X. 1st order category
Table 2and possibly distinguish between not only individual cases but
also classes of project capabilities - according to different
sectors, types and scales of projects, to name a few. Future
research might also examine project capabilities for the delivery
of operational outcomes as a phenomenon that alters during the
different phases of the system lifecycle. While this study
focused on the project back-end as the intersection between the
operational and dynamic capabilities and routines, future work
can investigate whether project capabilities acquire a different
shape in other stages of the systems lifecycle.
Finally, future research could adopt different epistemolog-
ical and theoretical angles to understand the phenomenon of
project capabilities. One example of such potentially fruitful
avenue for future research would be to investigate the
unforeseen adaptation, coordination, and alignment challenges
that emerge around project handover as a fixed organisational
boundary (Zerjav, 2015) while a complex project unfolds as a
non-decomposable problem-solving system. Epistemologi-
cally, this avenue of future research could adopt the perspective
of, for example, organisational design (Simon, 1969/1996; Gil
and Baldwin, 2014) or practices (Jarzabkowski and Spee, 2009;
Nicolini, 2012; Marshall, 2014). It is though important to note
that by identifying some (in our opinion) relevant avenues to
drive the future research agenda on project capabilities in inter-
organisational settings, we are not excluding other (equally if
not more so) insightful or applicable theoretical conversations
in project studies, as well as theorising in mainstream strategy,
organisation and management studies. Concluding, we argue
that future studies could leverage the explanatory power of
project capabilities to further explore how exploration and
exploitation practices in projects can translate into value
accrued after the delivery of projects to users and operators.Acknowledgments
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Table 2 (continued)
Second-order themes and first-order categories Representative data
Reconfiguring project capabilities
1. Legacy expectations
A. Expectations of big client – media coverage A1. “I met the Queen on Monday and she asked me, “Is the baggage system working?” that was her first
question. It's just in people's psyche that there was actually a baggage system problem. The reality is it
was much bigger than that and…”
A2. “With regards to commissioning we learnt from, again from T5 there is a real necessity to basically flip
from a construction led project to a commissioning led project and then to an OR led project.”
A3. “But what you do find is doing it this way, the media move on very quickly. They're interested in the
opening, they're interested in the celebration event and then.”
A4. “Typically what happens in an opening is the excitement is here 'cause you're usually failing,
unfortunately, yeah?”
A5. “One of the key drivers for T2 was, from a build perspective, was to do it the best we've ever done it, to
be the safest project, to open it efficiently and effectively, obviously to put the ghosts of T5 to bed, but
also conscious that all these other airports haven't been successful.”
A6. “On T5 we did familiarisation, induction and training as one offer, and we said, hang on a second, so
let's get this right, on reflection. We're changing the environment within which you work – one big
change, and we're teaching you about how to do your job – two big changes.”
B. Experience of T5 means opening must be
smooth
B1. “From the very beginning we had a slogan on this project: Nothing new on T2”
B2. “I think T5 could have been done in a softer way as well, perhaps moving T1 first, and then T3 second,
or T4 or whatever. So I think T5 could have been done more progressively, it was very ambitious to
move it all in one hit.”
B3. “So I came out with - and I'm very happy to share these with you, but I haven't got them to hand –
what I call there's almost 10 golden rules that I learnt from T5. These are things like…the very central
piece is we opened T5 with 400 flights on the first day. We opened here with 36 flights on the first day.
I'm absolutely certain had we opened T5 with 36 flights, it would have been good enough. It would
have been good enough.”
B4. “This approach was definitely a result of what we had learned from the opening of T5 – we called it a
‘small and often’ strategy rather than a ‘big bang’ strategy.”
2. Reputational risk
C. Competition with other hub airports C1. “Massively valuable solution that we can apply for Star – they'll go to Paris, they'll go, you know. And
they've declared cost savings through what they're doing here, along with a model that customers want
to use.”
C2. “They're all either not good or a disaster, you know. Berlin, disaster, Doha, is it open yet…”
C3. “We actively participate and lead in that arena, and we want worldwide for Heathrow to be seen as
being at the leading edge of driving this stuff. But it's quite difficult for others to quickly adopt it. So [a
competitor airport], for example, could they adopt it? They haven't got Star down there really in this
sort of critical mass.”
Overarching dimension: adapting project capabilities
3. Adaptation strategies
D. Responding to change of occupier while
project was ongoing
D1. “Halfway through, BMI went bust. We again had to rewrite processes, the client changed. The idea
was to go to Star Alliance and put them all under one roof.”
D2. “At that point, it was clear that we could not work as before. The traditional check-in would require us
to have more check-in desks in this terminal then there was space for.”
D3. “Effectively the building originally was designed and tailored to what BMI and the other airlines
wanted, based on their client needs if you like. Us, if you like, being the master client but them being
our customers and what do you want within the building.”
D4. “I think it's important to be able to react. That's not relying on a reactive methodology, but you are,
you end up having to be reactive, but it's from a position of: we had the capability and we knew that, if
you are going to be reactive, this is how we do it. This is the governance, these are the people that you
need to involve.”
E. Arranging airline moves E1. “In 18 months 26 airlines had to agree that they will have common IT, [processes, check-in agent,
etc.]”
E2. “So the whole airline moves process that was a big risk, I mean a huge risk of success or failure. People
like [airline] didn't want to move into Terminal 2 because they were entrenched probably in their
original space. They didn't want to move because it probably frightened them.”
E3. “So what we wanted to do is have all of the airlines certified by us through that model terminal by the
end of October last year. The plan never turns out as you expect it, so to be fair three quarters of them
got to that point and then we were managing the tail thereafter.”
4. Serendipitous innovation
F. Redesigning check-in process and area F1. “The biggest innovation on T2 is the common check-in. You can check in for any flight at any desk,
allows for best utilisation of the check in desks.”
F2. “But what they said was, in simple terms, by being able to let anybody check-in to any kiosk or any
bag drop, we believe we can drive enough efficiency out to actually reduce that. Which then increases
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efficiency, reduces lower costs, or what it is doing is bringing something new in to here that then we've
got the challenge of delivering within here.”
F3. “Clearly, for us, having [airline name removed] as the lead airline was important. They were moving
through to time and plan, and the ones that were soon thereafter – [airline name removed], for example,
didn't want to do it. They just didn't believe that bag tags at kiosks was the right thing, so they just said
flat “we're not going to do it. Our customers don't want to do it”. I spent lot of my time on [airline
name removed], and Star were very good holding the line that says “well, if the agreement is there, if
you don't do it, you don't come”.”
G. Reconfiguring the ground handling process G1. “People like [airline name removed] had been doing their own ground handling in Terminal 3 for
30 years, or whatever, outsourced their ground handling to [ground handler company name removed],
so I think there was, on a single day in early May, [ground handling company name removed] picked
up seven contracts, so seven airlines changed their ground handling overnight, and you didn't hear
anything about that.”
G2. “BMI had accommodation requirements for their handling agents. So a lot of the facilities are sized
around that, and designed around that. When you look at their flight operations, then that has a big
impact.”
Overarching dimension: maintaining project capabilities
5. Rehearsal mind-set
H. Idea of operational readiness (or) as “the
fluffy bit at the end”.
H1. “OR is generally seen as “the fluffy bit at the end” and benefits are not too clear to the exec people.”
H2. “In their heads again it's the fluffy bit at the end that can just wait and they'll get it. The more that you
do it, and the more that you show them what you're doing, the more that they understand that actually,
“I can see why you're doing that now.””
H3. “We know we've been here for our proving trials. We know we've been here on our training. We've
done proving trials of volumes. We've done a live flight.”
I. Arranging gradually more complex trials
from devices, to stripes to zones
I1. “So we had stripes through the building, was another philosophy that we talked about, was
establishing, you know, routes for staff, routes for passengers, and getting those trials done early. And
you can do that, you know, you don't need a fully polished building in order to be able to trial, does
this work, does our way finding work, do the security systems work, and such like.”
I2. “So each one of these trials requires some of this to work and some of that. And so the baton almost
moves, so the baton continues to move from discipline to discipline. Because at the end of the day
these are the guys who get it over the line, so these are the people who finish it off. And they determine
how it all works.”
I3. “And what this also does is this proves that that actually works. So it proves how passengers move, it
proves that the check-in process works, you don't get queues. It proves that people can follow the
signs. So what this does is this unfortunately introduces change into the box. And it can be minor bits
of signage to you know major elements where you haven't got enough lifts”
6. Building of progressive confidence
J. Accounting for behavioural complexity of the
terminal - volunteer trials
J1. “So the build sequence needs to reflect the Operational Readiness trials and what does that mean you
know in terms of facility? How much of the facility needs to be finished to enable the trial to be done?”
J2. “I think one of the best learners or one of the best things that happened on T28 which I don't
necessarily think happened previously, and I'm sure it didn't because I was back at T5C, was that we
had live participants in OR trials and that made the difference. For me, you got the general public view
and these guys were playing the part, I mean they were volunteers but they played the part of
passengers and they were as vociferous and they were as loud as they needed to be.”
J3. “Oh they got into the role and to be honest with you, I think the smallest trial we started with was about
100 people and we went through a progressive stage up to 3000 people and that was the 18th or 19th of
May, that was just two weeks before the terminal was due to open we did a Saturday trial and there was
3000 people.”
J4. “There was the, ‘Show me you know,’ principle, which was done, again out of T5, people went on the
training, but there was never any checking that they took anything in. Sounds obvious but more often
than not when you're training 25,000 people, familiarising 25,000 people, you just churn, churn,
churn! And that's really important, to make sure people feel comfortable to, one, ask questions, but,
two, be able to know their routes etc.”
J5. “[W]hen you think about the operational readiness piece, and what our approach was, and how we
turned, going from a compliant building to compliant operations, that operational flow, it was all about
building progressive confidence, or capability – confidence through capability, so you could do it. So
at the end of it, everyone was not questioning, well, can this work? It was like, no, this can work –
we've done it before. We've been here before.”
J6. “[W]hat we'll do through operational readiness was prove it, test it, train people, so they became
familiar with that. We build confidence, one feels.”
K. Accounting for operational complexity of the
airlines
K1. “If you are building a building over a number of years, there is a point where the building is so
inhabited and being used, and because there's so many trials going, it's basically an operational
building, but contractually it's not been handed over…. We had guys commissioning stuff, turning
things on, turning things off, yet you had airlines and handlers.”
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K2. “One of the recommendations came out saying, “It would be great if you guys executed a live flight
before 4th June….””
K3. “But, more importantly, and I say more importantly because this is going to happen for the next 30 or
40 years, was to create a step change in our operational performance. We wanted operational staff to
take on the safety mantel and carry that through to operations. So there was a lot of great aspiration, to
take the level of performance of making every journey better, not just in terms of facility but in terms of
people, to another level.”
K4. “Because the challenge here is the facility looks fantastic, but it's not about the facility…. [part omitted
for brevity purposes]… [If] it's a tick box exercise, it doesn't prove the capability and it doesn't reduce
the residual risk that you're looking to mitigate.”
K5. “[Y]ou improvise as you go along, because the bottom line is, [e.g.] we need the security doors locked.
If we don't have a camera, what does that mean? It needs two people. Oh shucks, the guy's sick, the
door's unlocked. Right, well who's [going to cover this], we've got a list of back-up people, trained
and all that. They can then go and stand in. So if you're improvising, but you're improvising against a
well thought out strategy …”
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